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I: STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a DUI case and the primary issue is whether a police officer can threaten a forcible 
blood draw during the implied consent proceeding when the arresting officer has chosen a breath 
test for blood alcohol concentration ("BrAC") testing under Idaho Code 3 18-8002. 
B. THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT 
AND ITS DISPOSITION 
The DefendantIAppellant ("LeClercq") was issued a Uniform Citation by Idaho State 
Police Officer Travis DeBie for driving while under the influence of alcohol in violation of I. C. 
3 18-8004 ("DUI") on September 13,2008.' LeClercq submitted to a BrAC test on a device 
known as an Alco Sensor I11 which provided results of .141/.143.2 LeClercq filed an Amended 
Motion In Limine andlor Motion to Suppress dated November 19,2008 setting forth the basis for 
the primary issue on appeal: 
The Defendant also seeks suppression and/or an order in limine preventing 
the State's use of the Defendant's breath test results based upon the officer's 
threats to the Defendant that if she refused to submit to a breath test, she 
would be taken to a hospital where blood would be drawn. Those threats 
made by the arresting officer were made during the time of the application of 
Idaho's Implied Consent Statute, Idaho Code $3  18-8002 and 18-8002A and 
there does not exist a statutory authorization to make such threats before a 
suspected driver either agrees to take the breath test or refuses. The actions 
by the arresting officer amounted to not only a violation of Idaho's Implied 
Consent law, but also unlawfiilly coerced the Defendant to submit to the 
breath test when she could have refused. 
lSee, Record on Appeal (R.), p. 5. 
2R., pp. 7 and 8c. 
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This motion is based upon not only the violation ofthe statutory rights under 
Idaho's Implied Consent law, but also the due process and equal protection 
clauses of the United States and Idaho constit~tions.~ 
An evidentiary hearing was held on December 3,2008 before The Honorable R. Ted 
Israel, Blaine County Magistrate Judge, and a transcript of the hearing has been prepared and 
filed with the Court. A briefing schedule was organized by the magistrate and on January 14, 
2009 the magistrate filed its Memorandum Decision and Order denying LeClercq's motion." 
A Rule 11 Agreement was entered whereby LeClercq entered a conditional guilty plea, 
reserving the right to appeal the magistrate's decision? The magistrate entered an Order 
Withholding Judgment filed March 9,2009 and the execution of the sentence was stayed pending 
a ~ p e a l . ~  
LeClercq timely filed her Notice of Appeal bringing the matter before the District Court 
who affirmed the Magistrate? LeClercq then timely filed an appeal to this C ~ u r t . ~  
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On September 13,2008, ISP Officer Travis DeBie was on special enforcement in Blaine 
County, Idaho when, at 11: 18 p.m., Officer DeBie was traveling southbound on Highway 75 and 
made a visual estimate on a vehicle traveling northbound that the vehicle was speeding? Officer 
3R., p. 15. 
4R., p. 62. 
5R., pp, 71-75. 
'R., pp. 77-79. 
'R., p. 130. 
'R., pp. 135-138. 
SSee, Transcript, Appeal from Magistrate Division, December 3,2008 (hereinafter referred 
to as "Tr."), p. 8, Ls.1-3, Ls. 14-17; p. 10, Ls.1-8. 
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DeBie was on duty driving a marked ISP patrol vehicle with overhead lights!' The police officer 
checked the speed with radar at 63 mph in a 55 mph zone." The officer effected a stop by 
activating his overheads and LeClercq responded by pulling over and stopping her vehicle in the 
vicinity of milepost 123 on Highway 75.'' The officer made contact with LeClercq where he 
noted the odor of alcohol, bloodshot eyes, slurred speech and observations that suggested that 
LeClercq did not know how to roll down the passenger window of her vehicle.13 
LeClercq appropriately produced her driver's license, proof of insurance and 
registration.14 Officer DeBie then asked LeClercq for the keys to her vehicle and Officer DeBie 
returned to his patrol car to run a license check. 
When asked, LeClercq admitted to drinking some wine but "not that much" and she was 
asked to submit to roadside tests. Based upon her performance of those tests, she was talcen into 
custody, handcuffed and placed in DeBie's patrol car." Officer DeBie's patrol car was equipped 
with a mobile Alco Sensor 111 breath testing device? Officer DeBie then started proceedings 
under Idaho's implied consent law with the reading of the Notice of Suspension Form which was 
admitted as Defendant's Exhibit 6.j7 
1°Tr., p.11, Ls. 2-13; p. 12, Ls. 14-15. 
llTr., p. 12, Ls. 14-15; p. 13, Ls. 16-17. 
12Tr., p. 10, Ls. 21-22. 
13Tr., p. 20, Ls. 13-17. 
14Tr., p. 17, Ls. 14-16; p. 18, Ls. 5-15. 
15Tr., p. 27, Ls. 19-23. 
16Tr., p, 27, Ls. 24-25; p. 28, Ls. 1-6. 
17Tr., p. 28, Ls. 6-21; p. 33, Ls. 14-25; p. 34, Ls. 1-7. 
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While the officer was reading the Notice of Suspension Form and at various times 
throughout the 15-minute waiting period1', LeClercq asked whether she could refuse to submit to 
the breath test." 
On State's Exhibit 1, the DVD recording of this incident, Officer DeBie informed 
LeClercq, a number of times, that if she did not take the breath test she would be talcen to the 
hospital and her blood would be forcibly drawn. For example, Officer DeBie told LeClercq that 
if she rehsed "we can take you to the hospital and forcibly draw bl~od. '"~ About six minutes 
later Officer DeBie informed LeClercq that "you can say no [to the breath test] but I'll take you 
to the hospital to draw blood. It will be a refusal and you will lose your license for one year.'e' 
It came as no surprise that LeClercq ultimately agreed to submit to the breath test and her 
results were over the legal limit. 
I1 STANDARD OF RE VIEW 
When reviewing a decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, this Court 
reviews the trial court's record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence 
to support the magistrate court's findings of fact and whether the magistrate court's conclusions 
of law followed from those findings. State v. Turpen, 147 Idaho 869,216 P.3d 627 (2009). 
However, this Court exercises free review over questions of law. Id. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals set the standard a little differently by saying: 
The Supreme Court has recently altered the standard by which we review a 
decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity. Rather than 
directly reviewing the magistrate court's decision independently of, but with 
due regard for, the district court's decision, we instead directly review the 
district court's decision. Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 
T e e ,  Intoxilyzer 5000 Operator Training Manual (March 2007), p. 8, for "1 5-minute waiting 
period" procedure; see, also, Standard Operating Procedure - Breath Alcohol Testing (7/7/2009), p. 
6, 3 3, and 3.1 for further procedures on the 15-minute pre-test observation period. 
19Tr., p. 40, Ls. 8-25; p. 41, Ls. 1-14. 
2oSee, State's Exhibit 1, media player timer at 26:50. 
21See, State's Exhibit 1, at 32:20. 
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(2008). We do examine the magistrate's record to determine whether there 
is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of 
fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law followed from those 
findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow 
therefrom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, we 
affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Id.; Nicholls v. 
Blaser, 102 Idaho 559,633 P.2d 1137 (1981). 
State v. Dewitt, 145 Idaho 709,711, 184 P.3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008). 
The Dewitt court went on to further explain that "When reviewing a decision to grant or 
deny a motion to suppress evidence, the court employs a split standard of review. The court will 
defer to the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. [Citation omitted.] 
However, the court exercises free review over the application of constitutional standards to 
those facts." Id. 
The magistrate acknowledged that the circumstances surrounding LeClercq's submission 
to a breath test were "a bit more difficult" for the magistrate court's analy~is.~' Furthermore, the 
magistrate court indicated that it was "troubled in the present case by the officer's use of the 
word 'force' in describing what would occur if the defendant refused the breath test.'"3 
On appeal to the district court, the district court commented from the bench when 
rendering its decision that the court did "not countenance the process of advising drivers that 
their blood may be taken by force. . . ."24 However, both the Magistrate and the District Courts 
nevertheless reasoned that LeClercq's Motion In Limine andlor Motion to Suppress would be 
denied. 
III. ARGUMENT 
LeCLERCQ2S BRAC RESULTS SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BASED UPON THE 
POLICE OFFICER'S COERCIVE THREAT TO FORCIBLY DRA W BLOOD DURING 
THE IMPLIED CONSENT STAGE OF THE INVESTIGATION. 
22R., p. 59. 
Z3R., p. 65. 
24See, Reporter's Transcript on Appeal (filed January 7,2010), p. 23. Ls. 14-15. 
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This argument is based upon the theory that Idaho's implied consent law set forth in 
Idaho Code § 18-8002 does not include an advisory that if a driver refuses to submit to a breath 
test - or even if the driver has questions about the consequences of refusing to submit to a breath 
test - the police officer is not permitted by the statute to make a threat that blood will be forcibly 
drawn. If a police officer makes that type of threat, and the driver submits to a breath test, it is 
coerced, and the results should be suppressed. It may be permissible that the police can seek to 
draw blood, based upon sufficient legal cause after the implied consent proceedings have been 
concluded, but not during the implied consent phase. That bracket of time is controlled by 
Idaho Code 5 18-8002. Idaho Code 5 18-8002(1) provides: 
Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this 
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for 
concentration of alcohol as defined in 5 18-8004, Idaho Code, and to have given 
his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating 
substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request of a peace 
officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has been driving or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of 5 18- 
8004, Idaho Code or 5 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
The information that is required to be given to a driver during the implied consent phase 
is set forth in Idaho Code 5 18-8002(3). That provision reads: 
At the time evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol, or for the presence of 
drugs or other intoxicating substances is requested, the person shall be informed 
that if he refuses to submit to or fails to complete, evidentiary testing: 
(a) He is subject to a civil penalty of two hundred fifty dollars ($250) for 
refusing to take the test; 
(b) His driver's license will be seized by the peace officer and a temporary 
permit will be issued; provided, however, that no peace officer shall issue a 
temporary permit pursuant to this section to a driver whose driver's license or 
permit has already been and is suspended or revoked because of previous 
violations, and in no instance shdl a temporary permit be issued to a driver of a 
commercial vehicle who refuses to submit to or fails to complete an evidentiary 
test; 
(c) He has the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days to show cause 
why he refused to submit to, or complete evidentiary testing; 
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(d) If he does not request a hearing or does not prevail at the hearing, the court 
shall sustain the civil venaltv and his driver's license will be suspended absolutely 
for one year if this is his first refusal and two (2) years if this is his second refusal 
within ten (10) years; and 
(e) After submitting to evidentiary testing he may, when practicable, at his own 
expense, have additional tests made by a person of his own choosing. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The statute does not contain language that allows a police office to threaten a suspect with 
a forced blood draw during the implied consent proceeding when a breath test is requested. 
It is clear that the officer has the choice as to what type of test will be given. See, Matter 
of Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364,744 P.2d 92 (1987) ("Therefore, we hold that the choice as to which 
type of evidentiary test for concentration of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances will 
be requested rest with the police officer, not the defendant." Id. at 113 Idaho 170.) It is also clear 
that Idaho law requires strict adherence of the statutory language of Idaho's implied consent 
statute and the Idaho "Supreme Court has emphatically discountenanced interjection of judicial 
gloss" and the "clear terms of the statute" must be followed. See, Matter of Beem, 119 Idaho 
289,895 P.2d 495 (Ct. App. 1991). As stated by the Idaho Court of Appeals in Matter of Virgil, 
126 Idaho 946,985 P.2d 182 (Ct. App. 1995) (pet. rev. denied 1995): 
Idaho law requires strict adherence to the statutory language of I. C. 5 18-8002(3). 
This Court has previously held that the information required by I. C. $18-8002 is 
set forth "in no uncertain terms," Beem, 119 Idaho at 291, 805 P.2d at 497, and 
that our Supreme Court has "emphatically discountenanced interjection ofjudicial 
gloss upon the legislature's license suspension scheme." Id. at 292, 805 P.2d at 
498. 
Matter of Virgil, 126 Idaho at 947. 
When the government administers a BAC test, it constitutes a seizure and a search for 
evidence that implicates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution?' Searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are 
25Greater protection under Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution is provided based 
upon the uniqueness of our state, our constitution, and our longstanding jurisprudence. See, State 
v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 188 P.3d 867 (2008). The Idaho Constitution is afforded greater 
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presumptively unreasonable and to overcome that presumption, the State bears the burden of 
establishing two prerequisites. First, the State must prove that a warrantless search fell within a 
well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement; and, second, the State must show that 
even if the search is permissible under an exception to the warrant requirement, it must still be 
reasonable in light of all the other surrounding circumstances. Schmevber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757,767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L.Ed. 2d, 908,917 (1966); Slate v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300,302, 
160 P.3d 739,741 (2007). 
The two exceptions that the Idaho appellate courts have considered when analyzing the 
seizure of BAC evidence fiom a suspect are exigent circumstances and consent. In the LeClevcq 
case, the exigent circumstance does not apply since Officer DeBie was proceeding under Idaho's 
implied consent statute. Again, in LeClercq's view, these are two separate and distinct 
exceptions to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 17 of 
the Idaho Constitution: It is not an amalgam of exceptions that create an end result. If the 
government proceeds under an exception for the extraction of a BAC test, then that search and 
seizure must be independently analyzed based upon the exception and the circumstances that 
permit an extraction of BAC evidence under the particular exception. 
Accordingly, the issue that is being raised by LeClercq focuses on the proper application 
of the exception to the warrant requirement based upon Idaho's implied consent law. Idaho's 
implied consent law does not grant or convey express consent, rather it is implied consent that 
arises based upon compliance with the "strict adherence" to the statute. That mandatory 
language in the statue cannot be modified, nor amplified, by the words of a police officer. 
LeClercq recognizes that there are cases that suggest that a police officer's failure to 
properly convey the mandatory language in Idaho Code $ 18-8002 to the driver, does not require 
the exclusion of evidence; e.g., see, State v. Burris, 125 Idaho 289,869 P.2d 1384 (Ct. App. 
1994); State v. Harmon, 13 1 Idaho 80,85,952 P.2d 402,407 (Ct. App. 1998). However, a 
protection than the Fourth Amendment based upon the uniqueness of our state and how its citizens 
embrace the idea of individuality and the protection from government interference. Also, our 
constitution is unique when compared to the Fourth Amendment when considering the time fiame 
of adoption and the fact that the exclusionary rule was applied in Idaho, under the Idaho 
Constitution, long before it took effect in other states. 
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review of those two cases, and the other Idaho appellate cases which have discussed this issue 
show, at least in LeClercq's view, that the Idaho appellate courts have not considered this precise 
issue being raised by LeClercq. There is even language instate v. Harmon that the court would 
not "entirely rule out the possibility that a search conducted pursuant to the statutory consent 
could be rendered unreasonable . . ." based upon improper police conduct. See, State v. Harmon, 
131 Idaho at 85. 
LeClercq's theory takes on more validity when one considers the results instate v. 
Madden, 127 Idaho 894,908 P.2d 587 (Ct. App. 1995), and State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181,911 
P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1996). The suppression of evidence in those cases was premised upon the 
application of I. C. 5 18-8002. In Madden, the Idaho Court of Appeals suppressed from evidence 
the defendant's breath test results for failure of the police to comply with the defendant's request 
for an independent test which is permitted by Idaho Code 5 18-8002. The exclusion of evidence 
was based upon a statutory violation. In Carr, the Idaho Court of Appeals suppressed the 
defendant's breath test results for failure of the police to permit Carr to place a telephone call to 
her lawyer afier a request to do so. The suppression of evidence in Carr was based upon a due 
process violation, not a direct statutory violation. 
Carr is interesting because the implied consent statute explicitly prohibits a driver from 
calling a lawyer during the application of the implied consent statute. Once Carr had completed 
submitting to a BrAC test, she started making requests to place a telephone call to her lawyer 
which was denied by the jail for a significant amount of time. The Carr court held that even 
though there was no explicit authority in the implied consent statute that a driver could, at some 
point, make a call once the BAC testing was completed, the court reasoned that in order to 
effectively make use of the ability to an independent test, which is specified in the statute, that a 
lawyer would be the one to properly advise the driver of that benefit. The Carr court found that 
the defendant's due process rights were violated when her efforts to communicate with a lawyer 
were frustrated. 
It is from these cases, Madden and Carr, that LeClercq submits that there is a phase of the 
investigation or, as referred by the decision in Matter of McNeely, 119 Idaho 182,804 P.2d 91 1 
(Ct. App. 1990,pet. rev. denied 1991) an "evidentiary procedure that is implicated during the 
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application of I. C. $ 18-8002." See, Id., 119 Idaho at 187. In LeClercq's view, there is a 
beginning and an end to the implied consent "evidentiary procedure" which is governed by I. C. 5 
18-8002. For example, the implied consent procedure begins with the pretest procedures 
including the 15-minute observation period and a notification of the information contained in 
Idaho Code $ 18-8002(3). It is during that time that the driver is not entitled to communicate 
with counsel. But, as recognized by Madden and Carr, once the BAC testing procedures are 
completed, the driver is entitled to try to make arrangements for an independent test and, clearly, 
is entitled to communicate with counsel. Thus, it is LeClercq's position that during that phase, or 
block of time, the evidentiary procedures are strictly limited to the information that can be 
conveyed in Idaho Code $$ 18-8002 and 18-8002A. 
Thus, when LeClercq was questioning her rights with Officer DeBie concerning the 
consequences of refusing to submit to a breath test, those rights are clearly stated in paragraph 4 
of the Notice of Suspension, Defendant's Exhibit 6, and even if a driver is equivocating on 
whether or not to take a breath test, it is improper under Idaho law for a court to allow a police 
officer to threaten the suspect with a forcible blood draw if they refuse to submit to a breath test. 
Otherwise, a driver's implied consent to submit to evidentiary testing is not properly based upon 
what the statute requires. LeClercq contends that, if a police officer does that, then the breath 
test is obtained in violation of the statute, the suspect's due process rights, and is obtained 
through coercion. It is only under Idaho Code $ 18-8002(10) that if a person submits to a breath 
test, he may also be requested to submit to a second evidentiary test for blood or urine, but only 
upon the satisfaction of certain conditions met by the police officer; i.e., the peace officer must 
have reasonable cause to believe that the person was DUI for a drug or intoxicating substance, or 
combination thereof, with alcohol and the peace officer must state those facts in his report upon 
which that belief is based. That exception does not apply to LeCiercq's case. 
This issue being raised by LeClercq is different than the situation that was analyzed in 
State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007, reh 'g denied). In Diaz, the Idaho Supreme 
Court framed the issues as: 
In this opinion we address two issues: (1) whether an involuntary blood draw 
violates federal or state constitution protections in cases where no death or 
serious bodily injury is involved, and (2) whether Idaho Code $ 18- 
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8002(6)(b) prohibits involuntary BAC testing in cases where no death or 
serious bodily injury is involved. 
144 Idaho at 302. 
Diaz initially refused to submit to a breath test, the police officer told him that if he 
continued to refuse he would be taken to the hospital for a blood draw. Diaz continued to refuse 
to submit to the breath test whereupon he was taken to the hospital for a blood draw. In 
LeClercq's situation, she did not refuse to submit to a breath test: she took it. LeClercq was only 
asking Officer DeBie during his reading of the Notice of Suspension Form, Defendant's Exhibit 6 
(NOS), about her understanding that a person could refuse to submit to a breath test. Diaz did not 
raise the precise issue being raised by LeClercq. 
In response to those questions, even before DeBie started reading the NOS Form, 
LeClercq made a statement, in the form of a question, wondering whether a person could say no to 
a breath test.26 At 25:14 DeBie finished reading the NOS Form and at 26:35 DeBie states that it 
has been five minutes and we need to wait another ten minutes. At 26:49 the LeClercq states: "I 
thought people could refuse?" At 26:53 DeBie states: "You can refuse but I would take you to the 
hospital and we would do a forced blood draw." At 26:56 DeBie states: "Idaho State law we can 
forcibly take your blood if you do not submit a sample." Then at 32:20, before the expiration of 
the 15-minute waiting period, LeClercq once again states: "I thought you could say no I'm not 
taking it?" DeBie responds with: "You know what, you can say no but we will take you to the 
hospital and we will take blood from you." At 32:25 DeBie states: "But yeah, you can say no but 
it's counted as a refusal and your license will be suspended for a year - that's your decision." At 
37:40 LeClercq submits to the breath test. 
It does not appear that Idaho has addressed who bears the burden of proving, and to what 
degree, a contention that a driver's implied consent became involuntary based upon the 
information conveyed by a police officer. In Erdman v. State of Texas, 861 S.W.2d 890 
(Tex.Cr.App. 1993) (reh'g denied) a concurring judge wrote that: "In cases where the defendant 
State's Exhibit 1 at 21:OO. 
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contends his consent to take the intoxilyzer was involuntary, the state bears the burden of proving, 
by clear and convincing evidence, that the consent was voluntary." Id. 861 S.W.2d 895. In a 
recent Idaho case that examined the voluntariness of a consent to search a residence, some general 
guidelines cited in that case may be helpful. See, State v. Ballou, 145 Idaho 840, 186 P.3d 696 
(Ct. App. 2008). In Ballou, the Idaho Court of Appeals found that the state has the burden of 
demonstrating consent by a preponderance of the evidence for the search of a residence. Id The 
state must show that the consent was not the result of duress or coercion, either direct or implied. 
Id The voluntariness of an individual's consent is evaluated in light of all the circumstances. Id. 
Whether consent was granted voluntarily, or was the product of coercion, is a question of fact to 
be determined by all of the surrounding circumstances. Id. 
An argument similar to LeClercq's was analyzed by the Colorado Supreme Court in 
Turbyne v. State of Colorado, 151 P.3d 563 (2007) (reh 'g denied). The Colorado statute is a little 
different, not only in name where it is called an express consent law,t7 but the driver has the 
choice of either a breath test or a blood draw. In Colorado, if a blood test is requested by the 
driver, a blood sample must be obtained within two hours. 
In Turbyne, the driver requested a blood draw but due to the unavailability of a 
phlebotomist and weather conditions, the arresting officer was infolmed by dispatch that they 
would not be able to provide a blood draw within two hours. So the police officer requested that 
Turbyne submit to a breath test: Turbyne continued to insist on a blood test. The arresting officer 
repeated that Turbyne could take a breath test but Turbyne refused. When the officer told 
Turbyne that he could lose his license if he did not submit to a breath test, Turbyne agreed to take 
the breath test. 
Turbyne filed a motion with the trial court to suppress the results of the breath test and 
also argued at the motor vehicle license revocation hearing that the revocation proceeding should 
be dismissed because the police officer did not have good cause for not complying with Turbyne's 
selection of the blood test. The hearing officer agreed and dismissed the revocation proceeding. 
27Colorado had previously referred to it as an implied consent law. 
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At the trial court, Turbyne also requested at the evidentiary hearing for a dismissal of the 
charges which the court agreed to do for the same reason that the hearing officer had dismissed 
because the police officer lacked sufficient cause for not complying with Turbyne's selection of a 
blood test. On appeal before the Colorado Supreme Court, they reversed the order of dismissal 
but agreed that the breath test results should be suppressed "because they resulted from an invalid 
consent to search, due to the arresting officer's erroneous and coercive advice to Turbyne that he 
could lose his license by not submitting to a chemical test he had not selected." 
The Colorado Supreme Court reviewed a number of cases2' which held that a trial court 
may dismiss a case in appropriate situations where a police officer failed to comply with the 
express consent law. The Colorado Supreme Court, however, recognized that sanctions must be 
tailored to remedy improper police conduct which may include not only a dismissal but also 
suppression of evidence and other circ~mstances.~~ 
As stated by the Turbyne court, "A valid consent to search must be voluntary rather than 
the result of intimidation, coercion, or deception." [Citations omitted.] "The court must first 
determine whether there is 'objective evidence of coercion, duress, deception, promises, threats, 
intmsive conduct or other undue influence by the police, which critically impaired the defendant's 
judgment.' " (Citations omitted.) 
As noted above, another case, more on point, was decided in 1993 by the Court of 
Criminal Appeals of Texas En Banc, entitled Erdman v. State of Texas, 861 S.W.2d 890. Erdrnan 
was arrested for DWI and filed a motion to suppress the results of a breath test which was denied 
by the trial court. Erdman pled guilty but reserved the right to appeal the suppression question 
which first went through the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court but then, en banc, the 
panel granted Erdman's petition for discretionary review and reversed. 
"People v. Gillette, 629 P.2d 613 (1981) and Riley v. People, 104 P.3d 218 (2004). 
"See, Dike Y. People, 30 P.3d 197 (2001) (stating that a driver is not permitted to change his 
or her initial election of a chemical test) and People v. Shinault, 940 P.2d 380 (1997). 
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After being arrested for DWI, Erdman was advised of the Texas implied consent law.30 
However, in addition to that the trooper went beyond the bounds of the Texas implied consent 
statute and also told Erdman that if he failed the test he would be charged with a DWT but also 
"warned" appellant that if he refused to take the test, then (1) evidence of his refusal would be 
admissible against him in a subsequent prosecution, (2) his driver's license would be suspended 
for 90 days, (3) D. W.I. charges would be filed against him and (4) he would be placed in jail that 
night. 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress before the trial court, defense counsel argued that 
Erdman's consent to the intoxilyzer test was involuntary because it was psychologically coerced. 
The state countered that the defendant made the decision to take the breath test without coercion 
from the police and the police officer simply stated the facts. In the trial court's ruling on the 
suppression motion it stated, "I do not think that [the trooper's warning] was coercive in nature. I 
think that [it] was explanatory and reasonably accurate in light of the situation here . . . . I will 
not suppress the breath test." 
Erdman's argument to the en banc Criminal Court of Appeals was that the Texas implied 
consent statute as punishment for refusing, only provided that a motorist's driver's license would 
be suspended for 90 days and that his refusal could be admitted into evidence if subsequently 
prosecuted. The appellant also argued that the statue "implicitly prohibits peace officers from 
'threatenling] motorists with sanctions . . . not permitted by the statute,' " and that the trooper's 
misstatement of the direct consequences of refusing rendered Erdman's previously given implied 
consent, as being involuntary. 
Here is some pertinent language from the Erdman decision: 
. . . A suspect's decision to submit to a breath test must truly be her own, made 
freely and with a correct understanding of the actual statutory consequences 
of refusal. To be "voluntary" and thus consistent with the statutory scheme, 
a suspect's decision to submit must not be the result of physical or 
psychological pressures brought to bear by law enforcement officials. Forte 
v. State, 759 S.W.2d 128, 138 (Tex.Cr.App. 1988) (consent to breath test 
involuntary if induced by physical force); Hall v. State, 649 S.W.2d 627,628 
(Tex.Cr.App. 1983) (consent to breath test involuntarily if induced by 
30Texas revised civil statutes, Article 6107 1-5, § 2 . 
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misstatement of direct statxtory consequences arising from refusal). If law 
enforcement officials were permitted to "warn" D.W.I. suspects-even 
correctly-that a refusal to submit would result in consequences not 
contemplated by Article 6701 1-5, fi 2, then suspects could easily be coerced 
into submission, and the protection afforded by this statutory section would be 
undermined. 
Here, appellant consented to the intoxilyzer test only after the trooper gave 
him warnings, both contemplated and not contemplated by Article 6701 1-5, 
concerning the consequences of refusal. The non-statutory information 
conveyed to appellant (that he would be jailed and charged with D.W.I.) was 
of the type that would normally result in considerable psychological pressure 
upon a D.W.I. suspect to consent to the taking of a breath sample. Given the 
complete absence of any record evidence showing that this non-statutory 
information given to appellant had no bearing on his decision to consent, no 
rational factfinder could conclude that the State carried its burden of showing 
that appellant's consent was voluntary. Thus, appellant's consent to the 
intoxilyzer test was obtained in violation of Article 6701 1-5, fi 2, and, 
therefore, the test results were inadmissible under Article 38.23. The trial 
court abused its discretion in refiising to suppress those test results. 
* * *  
We are holding only that law enforcement officials must take care to warn 
D.W.I. suspects correctly about the actual, direct, statutory consequences of 
rehsal. Any other information conveyed to D.W.I. suspects may have the 
effect-either intended or unintended, of undermining their resolve and 
effectively coercing them to consent. 
Id ,  861 S.W.2d at 893-894. 
Although DeBie's statements to LeClercq that he would take LeClercq to the hospital and 
forcibly draw blood were not accompanied with physical violence or verbal harassment, that 
level is not required for the Court to find that LeClercq was coerced through deception and 
intimidation. However, as highlighted by DeBie's statements, noted above, and with the 
incorrect statement that if she refused she would lose her driving privileges for one year:' and 
she agreed to submit to the test. 
31DeBie's statement that LeClercq would lose her license for one year was absolute and was 
not conditioned, as required by the statute, that she was nevertheless entitled to a show cause hearing 
to show cause why she may have refused to submit to the test. 
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Under Diaz, the State is not permitted to conduct a blood draw unless that is the BAC test 
first chosen by the police officer, or, the suspect refuses to submit to a breath test. At that point, 
then, the implied consent proceedings are done and then the police can go about obtaining a 
blood draw under ihe exigent circumstance exception. The important distinction to note between 
LeClercq's case and Diaz is that the police officer in Diaz did not make the threat to go to a 
hospital to draw blood until after Diaz refused to submit to the test. LeClercq agreed to take the 
breath test through coercion. The issue in LeClercq is what other information can be conveyed to 
a driver during the implied consent phase of a case. 
A driver's license and the right to operate a vehicle upon the roads in the State of Idaho is 
a property interest and is "a right or liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the 
guarantees of the federal and state constitutions." Adams v. City of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 99,416 
P.2d 46 (1996). Thus, in order to take away a person's right or liberty to drive, due process must 
be established and followed. The due process that has been promulgated by the Idaho legislature 
to take away a person's driver's license for refusing to submit to, or failing, evidentiary testing 
has been set forth in Idaho Code $$ 18-8002 and 18-800212. The statutory scheme of due process 
that has been implemented cannot be modified by the police officer when, such as in this case, 
Officer DeBie told LeClercq that he would forcibly draw her blood if she refused to submit to a 
breath test. The penalties and punishments for refusing to submit to a BAC test are specifically 
spelled out in Idaho Code $ 18-8002. 
As stated by the Washington Supreme Court instate v. McNichols, 128 Wash.2d 242, 
906 P.2d 329 (1995), "The importance of the statutory requirement [under Washington's implied 
consent law] is the protection of the accused's right to fundamental fairness, which is built into 
the implied consent procedure." McNichols, 906 P.2d at 333. "The implied consent warnings 
enable the accused to make an informed an intelligent decision about how to exercise his or her 
statutory right." Id 
Nowhere in the Idaho implied consent law does it say that during the procedures to 
submit to evidentiary testing that a police officer can inform the driver that if they refuse a 
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request to submit to a breath test, they will be taken to a hospital where blood will be "forcibly" 
drawn. 
The issue here in LeClercq is different than those lines of cases that permit the draw of 
blood based upon exigent circumstances as an exception to the Fourth Amendment. See, State v. 
Woolery, 116 Idaho 368,775 P.2d 1210 (1989); State v. Dewitt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 
(Ct. App. 2008). 
IV: CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, LeClercq respectfully requests this Court to reverse the 
Magistrate Court's denial of LeCIercq's MotionIn Limine and/or Motion to Suppress. 
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